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The advent of the Internet has enabled developers to write and share software 
components with each other more easily. Developers have become increasingly 
reliant on code other than their own for application development; code that is often 
not well tested, and lacking any kind of security review, thus exposing its consumers 
to security vulnerabilities. The goal of this thesis is to adapt existing techniques, and 
discover new approaches that can be used to discover security vulnerabilities in 
applications. We use fault injection in each of our techniques and define a set of 
  
criteria to evaluate these approaches. The hierarchy of approaches, starting from a 
black box and ending in a full white box approach, allows a security reviewer to 
choose a technique depending on the amount of information available about the 
application under review, time constraints, and extent of security analysis and 
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Software today is incredibly complex, making software engineering one of the 
most, if not the most challenging among all engineering disciplines. Programs will 
almost always have bugs in them; however, the most worrisome of these bugs are 
(security) vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an attacker to compromise an 
application. With developers increasingly adopting a componentized model for 
creating software, wherein they utilize code written by others in their applications, a 
vulnerability in one critical component has the ability to compromise all applications 
that depend on this module.  
In programming today, security is often an after-thought; it is secondary to 
other more important considerations such as performance and usability. However, 
attackers are smarter, more energized, and more motivated than ever to compromise 
applications. In a recent paper, Panjwani et al showed that in 48 days, 760 different 
attackers attacked two computers that had 25 open vulnerabilities (each attacker was 
assumed to be associated with a source IP address) [1]. The invention of the Internet 
has made hacking all that much easier; a computer connected to the Internet is now 
susceptible to attacks from hackers all over the world. Security is a significant 
challenge, and it is bound to become more critical in the future, with applications 





Software testing and security research has produced various static and 
dynamic techniques to find application vulnerabilities. There are two approaches to 
finding vulnerabilities in applications, static and dynamic. Static approaches look at 
source code to identify potential security vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, 
null pointer references, dynamic memory allocation and memory corruption [4, 5, 6]. 
In software testing, which is a dynamic approach, strategies such as penetration 
testing are used, where a tester assumes the role of an attacker and tries to exploit an 
application by finding vulnerabilities in its specification and architecture. Another 
dynamic approach, fault injection, which has been used extensively in hardware 
verification in the past, is slowly catching steam as a possible complement to static 
analysis and testing methodologies. In this thesis, we consider different fault injection 




Towards solving this problem, we start with an environmental perturbation 
approach, where we analyze the interactions between an application and its execution 
environment. An application runs on an Operating System (OS), and thus the 
execution environment consists of all resources that are outside the program, 
including OS services such as access to the file system, network interface, other 
processes executing on the machine and environment variables on the system. Every 
application receives and processes external input, be it from the user, or from a 
remote source over a network, or by reading files. These external interactions allow a 




When exposed to these faults, a program may behave differently than how it would 
under normal input, thus exposing a security vulnerability. 
Environmental interactions are a significant source of program vulnerabilities, 
and we would like to explore the usefulness of such a technique in the absence of 
program source code. Often, software components are only available as compiled 
libraries or executables, and do not include any source code listing. We are interested 
in exploring the applicability and usefulness of environmental fault injection given 
these constraints. 
An application interacts with its environment though OS system calls, and 
these system calls can be traced by monitoring the application at runtime. Through 
these traces, one can decipher the names of system calls, the parameters to the call, 
and even their return value. These three pieces of information provide a security 
reviewer with knowledge about the kind of resource being accessed by the program 
(name of the system call), the name of the resource (usually the first parameter), how 
the resource are being used (other parameters in the function), and the success or 
failure of the access attempt (return code). This information allows a fault injector to 
inject faults in resources as and when they are used in the program, so that the next 
time the program accesses the resource, the resource looks different or has properties 
that the developer did not consider when writing the program. 
Looking at an application’s behavior when a fault is injected sheds some light 
on the possibility of there being a security vulnerability in the program. We consider 
fault injection to be a hybrid of both fault and error injection. We use the term fault 




Under an environmental approach, faults are injected in resources that are external to 
the program, making the process relatively easy. The difficulty is in choosing the 
number and type of faults to be injected. The fault injector maintains a list of 
candidate faults that it can inject every time it encounters a certain system call. A 
security reviewer usually develops such a list before-hand. The particular fault 
injected is chosen based on the parameters to the system call.  
In addition to environmental interactions, there are others sources of security 
vulnerabilities in programs as well, such as the improper use of library functions, 
broken programming logic or even a careless oversight on the part of the developer. 
We clearly need a different approach to find such vulnerabilities, because while it is 
possible that such implementation gaffs appear when environmental resources are 
used, there is an equivalently large, if not bigger pool of problems that are 
independent of a program’s interactions with the outside world.  
A cursory look at the problem of finding general security vulnerabilities in 
applications leads to a rather simple conclusion. The extent to which a security 
reviewer will be able to analyze an application’s security characteristics and check for 
vulnerabilities is entirely dependent on the kind of information he/she has about the 
program. If a reviewer has full access to source code, then he/she can understand the 
security properties and assumptions of the program in detail, while if he/she is only 
provided with a compiled executable, then the reviewer is dependent on what 
information can be inferred by running the program and tracking its behavior. 
Clearly, not every person has access to source code, and similarly, there are occasions 




include application specifications, architectural designs, code comments, etc. We 
therefore see the need to develop a hierarchy of approaches that a security reviewer 
will be able to use as a reference when choosing a technique to discover security 
vulnerabilities in programs. A hierarchy allows us to define a taxonomy of 
techniques, with each technique relaxing the constraints imposed on that above it in 
the hierarchy. The technique chosen depends on how much is known about the 
program, the amount of time that can be invested in the analysis and the confidence 
level desired in the security behavior of the program. 
We start by assuming that the only information available about a program is a 
compiled executable, and slowly relax constraints and ultimately end up in a full 
white box approach where we assume that the reviewer has full access to source code. 
The hierarchy that we propose has five levels, a basic black box approach, an 
environmental approach, using a program’s flow graph information, using a flow 
graph with parameter metadata, and ultimately using the program’s source code. 
Each technique uses fault injection in its own unique way. While the black box 
approach injects faults in program input, the environmental approach does so in 
resources used by the program. The basic flow graph and flow graph with parameter 
metadata techniques modify program variables, while the full source code approach 
looks at modifying program input and source code to detect vulnerabilities.  
 While the black box and environmental approaches use external 
representation of a program (a compiled executable), the two flow graph based 
approaches use internal program representations to find possible vulnerabilities. In 




which describes the control flow and data flow dependencies in an application. The 
goal of such an approach is to force a program into states that the programmer did not 
envision, either because of an improper understanding of the application 
requirements, or implementation bugs. When such a state is discovered, the program 
could be vulnerable, because there is a very good chance the programmer’s 
implementation would be unable to handle the wrong state and be susceptible to 
attack either as soon as the new state is discovered or somewhere else in the 
execution path of the program. 
While some of this information can be inferred by just looking at a program’s 
flow graph, there is a lot of insight that can be gained by having metadata that 
describes the programmer’s view of his implementation. Such metadata may include 
the programmer’s understanding of constraints on the values of input parameters to a 
function, and the function’s return value. The fault injector then attempts to find 
possible variable values, and control flow paths that would violate these programmer 
provided constraints. If such variable values and an execution path is discovered, 
there is a clear disconnect between the programmer’s view of his implementation and 
the actual implementation in source code. We consider this to be a vulnerability. 
Finally, with all of the program’s source code available, a security reviewer 
can use any of the static analysis techniques that is suggested in the literature, and use 
some of the dynamic techniques discussed earlier in this thesis, such as the black box 
and environmental approaches to find vulnerabilities in programs. In addition, the 
reviewer can modify source code to short circuit certain portions of the application, 




collection of functions at a time. Doing so will allow for small components of the 
bigger program to be reviewed one at a time. Each component can be analyzed more 
easily, and its security characteristics better understood.  
Each of the five approaches that make up the hierarchy sounds like a viable 
option for use by a security reviewer. However, in order to provide a meaningful 
comparison of the techniques, we propose four criteria to determine the usefulness, 
effectiveness and viability of each of our approaches. These four criteria are: 
i. The ability to choose a fault injection point 
ii. Ease of injecting a fault, i.e. the fault injection mechanism 
iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered 
 
The hierarchy of approaches when coupled with the relative merits and 
demerits of each as obtained by using the four criteria defined above gives a security 
professional enough hints to make a judicious decision on the approach(es) that 
would be best suited for his/her purposes. The choice of technique would be 
determined by the amount of time available for the review, the kind of knowledge and 
understanding that the reviewer has about the application, the level of confidence 




 In all of our techniques, we consider application crashes are indicative of 
vulnerable behavior by the application. This could also be viewed as a testing 
problem, wherein one looks at the availability perspective of execution. However, in 
our opinion, the ability to crash an application by injecting a fault (as our approaches 
do) provides a means for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and unleash a DoS 
attack. The effects of such an attack are exacerbated if the application is unable to 
perform its most basic functionalities. For example, if a web server can be crashed by 
having garbage data in a protocol string, then the server can be rendered useless very 
soon. 
 Similarly, application crashes also introduce a discussion about the distinction 
between finding vulnerabilities and correctness. Our black box approaches use 
crashes to find discover vulnerable behavior; the absence of source code or any other 
information about a program’s security policies makes analysis using other criteria 
rather difficult. Towards improving this, we propose output comparisons as another 
possible approach, the success of which greatly depends on the kind of information 
made available to the security reviewer.  
 
 
1.3 Thesis Contributions 
 This thesis greatly innovates around some of the work previously done by 
Melody Djam (under the guidance of Prof. Cukier) in the realm of environmental 
perturbation and proposes new techniques and a hierarchy that uses these techniques 




 The author inherited Pulad, a precursor to EFIVA, which is a tool described in 
this thesis. Significant amount of time was spent in understanding Pulad, fixing the 
source code to make it more robust and expand its functionalities. In particular, Pulad 
was a simple program that could track another application’s system calls, and modify 
file properties, i.e. it could cause environmental perturbations relating to the file 
system. The author invested time in actually determining how Pulad and the 
information that it gathered could be used in finding application security 
vulnerabilities. Pulad’s fault injection capabilities were enhanced so that it now had 
some intelligence. Instead of depending exclusively on human input to determine 
which faults it should inject at each interaction point, Pulad could now look at system 
calls, their parameters, and automatically determine the type and number of faults that 
can be injected.  
Further, Pulad was given the capability of comparing an application’s 
behavior before and after fault injection and determine if any security vulnerabilities 
were potentially exposed. Therefore, Pulad’s scope broadened from being a tool that 
could track system calls and modify file attributes to one that could also choose faults 
intelligently, track application behavior and output, and analyze the behavior to 
determine if a vulnerability was discovered. These enhanced functionalities were put 
to test by running the application on real world test scenarios. Hence, the author’s 
work transformed Pulad into an Environmental Fault Injector and Vulnerability 
Analyzer (EFIVA). 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
 The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2: Environmental 
Perturbation and Fault Injection describes environmental interactions, and the fault 
injection process, and how when used together, these two techniques can be an 
effective mechanism for finding vulnerabilities in applications. Chapter 3: EFIVA: A 
tool to discover program vulnerabilities describes the architecture and 
implementation details of the tool that we developed to test some of the ideas and 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. It also describes some of our case studies that 
helped validate that EFIVA can be used effectively in a real-world environment. 
Chapter 4: Expanding on the Environmental Approach considers some of the pros 
and cons of the environmental approach proposed in Chapters 2 and 3, and describes 




hierarchy of approaches and the criteria that help evaluate each technique. Chapter 5: 
The Hierarchy of Approaches in Detail describes each of the approaches laid out in 
Chapter 4 in detail, and compares and contrasts of all these techniques in a tabular 
format. Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work discusses the conclusions of our 








With the ever-increasing complexity of software, there has been an explosion 
in the number of faults (bugs) present in software. While one would hope that most of 
these faults are benign, malicious users and attackers are always on the lookout for 
(security) vulnerabilities that can be exploited, thus compromising applications. 
Vulnerabilities are classified into three types [2,3], network, host and 
application. As with all software faults, there are two verification approaches to 
finding vulnerabilities in applications, static and dynamic. Static verification methods 
and tools (FlawFinder [4], RATS [5] and ITS4[6]) have been explored extensively 
and with good success to find certain classes of vulnerabilities such as buffer 
overflows, integer overflows, and race conditions. However, information gathered 
from the execution profile of an application may be very different from that inferred 
through static analysis, thus making dynamic techniques a worthy complement to 
static techniques. Several factors such as the environment, operating system 
scheduling and concurrent execution are often left unexplored by static approaches; 
these open up a completely new class of problems that may cause an application to 
fail. Even if static analysis tools were to look at these external factors, they would 





The other approach, dynamic verification involves software testing and fault 
injection. Among the various software testing strategies, penetration testing is most 
suitable to find security vulnerabilities. Penetration testing is a methodology whereby 
a tester intentionally tries to breach the security properties of an application by 
understanding its features and design. In [7], McGraw explains that penetration 
testing often occurs very late in the software development cycle, thus compromising 
the extent to which an application can be modified to fix any vulnerability that this 
approach may discover. Not only are there scheduling concerns with fixing 
vulnerabilities late in the cycle, but one also runs the risk of introducing a new 
vulnerability while fixing another. Software testing can be a useful tool to review the 
security characteristics of an application and with the right criteria, is successful in 
finding vulnerabilities. Our work focuses on the use of fault injection, which is the 
other form of dynamic verification.  
Fault injection, which has historically been used extensively in hardware 
manufacturing processes, can also be used as a method to review the security 
characteristics of an application. More recently, fault injection has been used to verify 
that applications behave as expected for different input combinations and to find 
security vulnerabilities, the latter to very limited extents. Fault injection as a 
technique can be used in three different ways; either before the application starts 
executing (pre-execution Fault Injection), or when it is actually run (execution Fault 
Injection), or a combination of the two. When an application is analyzed, either by 
looking at source code, or its design documents and description, or in our case 




that possibly violate some of the application’s assumptions. These conditions are 
immediately potential candidates for faults that can be injected either before the 
program starts executing, or during its execution phase. For example, if a program 
assumes the presence of an environmental variable, then deleting the variable before 
it is executed is an example of a pre-execution injected fault. 
While pre-execution fault injection has the potential to expose vulnerabilities, 
execution fault injection has a greater potential to expose vulnerabilities that may not 
be readily obvious from a static review of an application’s characteristics and 
behavior. In the previous example, let us assume that the environmental variable is 
deleted at runtime and not before the application starts execution. In such a situation, 
it is possible that in its first attempt, the application is able to read this variable, but 
fails when it tries to do so for a second time. If it fails on the second read, does the 
application use what it read before, or does it use some garbage value? Does the 
program crash or does it continue executing, albeit incorrectly? These interesting 
questions may be difficult to answer by looking at an application’s source code (for 
example, in a multi-threaded environment), yet become readily apparent at runtime. 
Further, execution fault injection allows the fault injector to automatically adapt to 
actions of the program under test. The faults injected can be modified depending on 
the application’s runtime behavior. On the other hand, pre-execution fault injection 
forces a re-run of the program every time a test parameter needs to be changed. This 
is because the fault injection system cannot automatically adapt itself to information 




manifest itself in terms of perturbations to the internal state (variables) of an 
application [8], or the execution environment, or a combination of both. 
While the jury is still out on the relative effectiveness of static vs. dynamic 
techniques, there are certain scenarios where one technique is naturally more 
applicable and effective than the other. As an example, static techniques could be 
extremely useful if an application’s source code is available, but would be unable to 
make a good security review with the availability of only a compiled EXE. However, 
in such a situation, a black box approach would be the best first step to finding faults 
and security vulnerabilities. 
2.1.1 Software Components without source code 
Software today is highly componentized and often makes extensive use of 
libraries and Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) written by different vendors. Such 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) components may have been exposed to very 
simple security reviews or sometimes none at all, making them potential targets for 
attackers, and a source of vulnerabilities for consuming applications. The majority of 
such components ship without source code, making the security analysis process 
more complicated for application developers and testers. Developers use libraries to 
ensure that the software development process is easier, but it is certainly not 
comforting when one’s application is compromised by code that is acquired outside 
the organization. This problem is even more pronounced for libraries that are freely 
available on the internet and are the product of a developer’s pet project.  
Thus, there is the need to develop a security-testing framework that will allow 




increasing number of security vulnerabilities due to environmental interactions, and 
the conduciveness of environmental perturbation to a black-box approach make 
interactions with the execution environment an ideal foundation on which to build our 
security platform. Further, the need to change environmental characteristics as an 
application executes makes fault injection the obvious choice for our research. 
One of the most recent works by Neves et al [9] uses fault injection to 
discover vulnerabilities in implementations of the IMAP protocol. Their tool, AJECT, 
checks for buffer overflow and other vulnerabilities by detecting email server crashes 
on various input combinations. They adopt black box approach and inject faults in the 
information packets that are sent to the email server, i.e. its input. While we also 
adopt a black box approach, in addition to injecting faults in application input, we 
perturb the execution environment by injecting faults in resources that a program 
uses, notably the file system. Further, we implement output matching to determine if 
a vulnerability has been discovered in the application. 
 
 
2.2 Environmental Interactions 
Environmental interaction [10] refers to an application’s use of resources or 
information from the environment where it is executed. These include files, 
communication over the network, communication with other processes, and 
requesting information (such as environment variables) from the operating system. 
When writing software, most programmers work with the implicit assumption that 
their application is the only one running on the system, and overlook the fact that 




file permissions and locations are handled, or how the program sends and receives 
messages over the network. Programmers make mistaken assumptions about the 
environment and do not account for the possibility that between its two uses in an 
application, a resource may have been used or modified by someone else, possibly 
with malicious intent. We consider environmental interaction to be a significant 
source of security problems in applications written today. 
In [10], Du and Mathur propose a white-box approach to identifying software 
vulnerabilities that result from environmental interaction. They enumerate potential 
faults that can be used to discover different types of bugs, such as those pertaining to 
IPC (Inter-Process Communication) or file system calls; the latter being responsible 
for 87% of faults injected directly through the environment. A direct environmental 
fault refers to a fault that stays within the environmental entity where it was injected. 
On the other hand, an indirect environmental fault is a fault that was injected in an 
environmental entity but propagates in a program though an internal program entity. 
Our efforts are thus focused on finding vulnerabilities related to improper use of the 
file system, as opposed to the network and IPC, which comprise the other 13% of all 
vulnerabilities. 
We use those faults that Du and Mathur recommend in their paper and are 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Entity Attribute Fault Injection 
 file name Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 




Directory Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 
insert special characters such as “..”, “/” in the name 
User Input 
Command Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 
insert special characters such as “|”, “&”, “>” or new 
line in the command 
file name Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 
use special characters such as “|”, “&”, “>” in the 
name 
Directory Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 
use special characters such as “|”, “&”, “>” in the 
name 
execution path Change length, rearrange order of path, insert a non 
trusted path, use incorrect path, use recursive path 
Library path Change length, rearrange order of path, insert a non 







Change mask to 0 so it will not mask any permission 
bit 
file name Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 
use special characters such as “|”, “&”, “>” in the 
name 
Directory Change length, use relative path, use absolute path, 







file extension Change to other file extensions like “.exe” in 
Windows system; change length of file extension 
file existence Delete an existing file or make a non-existing file exist 
file ownership Change ownership to the owner of the process, other 
normal users, or root 
file 
permission 
Flip the permission bit 
Symbolic link If the file is a symbolic link, change the target it links 




Modify contents of the file 
file name 
invariance 








Start application in different directory 
 







2.3 Fault Injection 
As with most fault injection methods, we use a three-step approach to find 
application vulnerabilities. The three steps are, discovering the fault injection point, 
injecting the fault, and determining if a vulnerability has been exposed. 
2.3.1 Discovering the fault injection point 
The OS system call layer is the abstraction that programs use to communicate 
with environmental resources, and other processes running on the machine. During 
execution, an application can be traced to determine the system calls that it executes, 
thus providing information about the parameters passed to a function, and the point in 
the application where the call is made. 
The parameters passed to a system call can be used to find information about 
the resources being used by the application, for example, the name a file, the kind of 
access permissions requested (read, write, both), and the number of times it is used. 
2.3.2 Injecting the fault 
The process of injecting a fault in an application involves two steps: 
i. Identifying candidate faults 
Table 1 above shows the different kinds of faults that we consider for use 
in our approach. The particular faults to be injected are determined from 
the trapped system call information. The name of the system call allows a 
filtering of the kind of faults to be injected based on category, while the 





ii. Injecting the fault into the application, or in our case the environment. 
As described in Table 1 above, the faults to be injected involve basic 
operations on files such as modifying their locations or attributes. These 
changes are easily implemented by using operating system Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs). 
2.3.3 Identifying a vulnerability 
We define two very simple criteria for discovering vulnerabilities in an 
application. The first is checking for application crashes. If an attacker knows how to 
crash an application, he can use the same technique repeatedly to create a DoS attack. 
The second technique that we propose is output comparison. If a security 
reviewer has some knowledge of the output to be expected from the application for a 
given input and environmental state, then this output can be compared against that 
actually produced by the application at runtime. If there a mismatch between the 
expected and actual program output, we assume that a potential vulnerability has been 
discovered in the program. 
While these two criteria are extremely useful, the vulnerability identification 
step of our approach still needs human help and intervention. Quite clearly, faults 
injected during program execution may open up several vulnerabilities that go 
undetected by just looking at the output produced, or expecting the application to 
crash. Similarly, output produced by a program when faults are injected may be 
correct, but since it differs from the template provided by the tester, a program 




intervention is necessary to reduce false positives, and in some cases detect missed 
cases. 
At the core of the problem is the lack of adequate knowledge about the 
operations performed by an application by just looking at its execution profile. This is 
a trade off that one encounters between black box and white box approaches. While 
the environmental fault injection approach that we propose is not as exhaustive as a 
brute-force testing technique or full state exploration using static methods, it has the 
potential to discover a significant number of vulnerabilities and report fewer false 




Chapter 3: EFIVA: A tool to discover program vulnerabilities 
 
Chapter 2 introduced the usefulness of an environmental approach, and 
provided the list of candidate faults that a fault injector can use to perturb the 
environment and discover security vulnerabilities. It also briefly mentioned EFIVA, 
the fault injector that we developed to test our ideas and hypotheses. In this Chapter, 
we discuss the architecture of EFIVA, and provide some insight into the 
implementation of this tool. 
EFIVA consists of three components, the collector, fault injector, and verifier. 
The collector is the component that runs the test application and records its 
interactions with the environment. EFIVA, as implemented now tracks interactions 
with the file system.  
The tool runs the application under test twice; in the first execution, it collects 
information about all system calls including the time of their occurrence. In the 




The collector in turn has three primary components; they are the Application 
Executor, the Environmental Interaction Scanner (EIS), and the Persistor. The 
collector module as a whole is responsible for running the application and collecting 






 Figure 1 Conceptual model of our dynamic, black box approach 
 
3.1.1 Application Executor 
The application executor is the simplest of the three collector components; it 
executes the application under test by calling the environmental interaction scanner, 
and providing it appropriate command line arguments. This is the tool’s interface to 
the outside world by accepting input about the application to be tested. 
3.1.2 Environmental Interaction Scanner 
The EIS module captures all file related application-environment interactions. 
It is built on Strace [11], which is a system call trace and debugging tool. Strace 
intercepts system calls made by an application without requiring its source code, or a 




Strace executes a user specified command, which is the name of the 
application under test and its corresponding command line arguments. All system 
calls made by the application and signals that it receives from the operating system 
are recorded in an output file. In particular, for each system call, Strace records the 
function name, its arguments and return value.  
Files being the focus of our work in the environmental interaction approach, 
we use Strace to track file system calls. Information gathered by Strace allows us to 
be intelligent about the faults injected. For example, one of the arguments in file 
system calls is the file I/O mode requested (Read, Write, etc). Modifying the 
corresponding file permissions enables us to inject faults that may have otherwise 
been difficult to discern by having a black-box representation of the application.  
While Strace as implemented provides us with a lot of useful information, we 
have included two enhancements that will open up a new class of faults that can be 
used for vulnerability detection. Two features we added were the ability to determine 
the owner of files used in the application, and its access time. The access time is 
measured relative to when the program started execution.  
In addition to collecting useful tracking statistics, Strace records unnecessary 
system calls and signals. For example, EFIVA is written in Java, and the Java process 
APIs are used to invoke Strace. This adds extraneous JVM environmental interactions 
to the output; EFIVA prunes out such information when Strace exits. Thus, at the end 
of one run, the tester now has a full trace of all file system interactions between the 




At this point, the EIS module, having completed its functionality transfers 
control to the persistor module. 
3.1.3 Persistor 
The persistor module takes all the information recorded by the EIS module 
and stores it in a database. EFIVA uses this information in its second run to inject 
faults. This database is a useful information store where the tester can try to analyze 
the interactions to effectively design test scenarios outside of vulnerability detection. 
For example, the tester may be able to create a functional test case based on the 
sequence of system calls executed, and their corresponding parameters. This may be 
useful for testing application functionality, and not just vulnerability discovery.  
 
 
3.2 Fault injector 
The fault injection process consists of two steps: first is identifying the type of 
faults to inject and the second is actually modifying resources or input, i.e. making 
the fault visible. 
3.2.1 Identifying the fault type 
EFIVA has the capability to inject more than one fault at an injection point. 
The user of the tool has full control to decide what faults should be injected, and 
where. In the absence of any specific input from the user, EFIVA tries to be as 
intelligent as possible with choosing how many and what kind of faults should be 
injected at each step. For example, when the tool detects a file open system call with 




inaccessible to the user. The file open system call would thus fail, but if such an error 
condition is not checked for in the application, there is the possibility of a null pointer 
dereference, which would ultimately end in a program crash. Table 2 below provides 
a sampling of some of the heuristics that the fault injector uses to choose faults based 
on the application’s runtime behavior. 
System Call Name System Call 
Parameters 
Faults injected Why these faults? 
Open () 
 







Name of file 
being opened 
- File existence 
 
- File ownership 
 
- File permission 
 







that the file being 
opened exists, and do 
not create one if it 
doesn’t. 
 
Use File content 





Change permissions of 
the directory where the 





Reads file contents 
Buffer size 
 
Name of file 
being read 
- File content 
invariance 
The application may 
crash if the kind of data 
included in the file is 















Name of file or 
path being 
accessed 
- File existence 
 
- File ownership 
 
- File permissions 
 




The various security 
properties may be 
checked by the 
application, but the 
application may be 
vulnerable if these 
properties change 
between when they 
were checked, and 





executing target to 
a symbolic link 
actually opened.  
 
For X_OK, having a 
symbolic link point to 
any arbitrary location 
may have the program 
execute malicious 
code. 
Table 2 Automatic fault injection decisions made by EFIVA 
 
Similarly, environment variables and user inputs are modified using 
techniques illustrated earlier in Table 1. 
 Figure 2 below provides a graphical representation of the algorithm used by 





List of candidate 
faults defined by 
user
Randomly pick 













Parameters to system call
YES
 




The application is executed for a second time, and in this iteration, faults are 
injected according to the user’s input or automatically.  
3.2.2 Making the fault visible in resources 
Once EFIVA has chosen the type and number of faults to inject, these faults 
need to be made visible in the environment at appropriate times in the program’s 
execution, i.e. when that particular resource is used by the application. EFIVA uses a 
time-based approach to inject faults.  
During its first run with Strace, the fault injector stores the time of access of 
each of the system calls, along with the call parameters. This time is relative to the 
start of program execution. During the second run, when faults are injected into the 
environment, EFIVA starts two threads of execution. The first thread injects the 
faults, while the second runs the program under evaluation. When the fault injecting 
thread hits time instances that match with those recorded in the first run, it modifies 
the corresponding environmental resources, i.e. injects the faults. We assume that the 
two threads of execution are given roughly equal time slices, keeping the timing 
distortion to a minimum.  
EFIVA stores the program output produced during this second execution to a 









The verifier module performs checks to determine if the application execution 
trace has opened any doors that can be used by an attacker to launch a security 
violation. As mentioned before, these checks come in two categories, crashes and 
output matching.  
In the former case, EFIVA automatically flags a crashed execution trace as a 
security problem, especially if the non-fault injected run exited without reporting any 
problems. While this may not truly be a security policy violation, it is certainly a 
vulnerability that needs to be fixed, or classified as one that the application writer 
never expects to encounter. 
In the latter case, output matching is used to report a possible vulnerability. 
EFIVA accepts a simple regular expression term that contains the expected output, 
and this is matched with the output actually produced by the application.  
Figure 3 below illustrates the algorithm used by the verifier to determine if the 


















Expected output as 
provided by reviewer











Figure 3 Algorithm to find application vulnerabilities 
 
EFIVA writes the test application output back into a file, allowing users to 
apply their own conditions to discover additional vulnerabilities. The above-
mentioned criteria can be very useful in characterizing application behavior when 
tested under a changing environment. However, the job of discovering the more 






3.4 Case Studies 
In order to verify that EFIVA is helpful in finding application vulnerabilities, 
we ran it on several input programs. This test code was scraped from code written by 
the first author for undergraduate projects; often at the freshman and sophomore 
levels. 
We picked tests that try to best illustrate the various capabilities that are 
programmed into the tool. In this section, we outline some of our code samples, the 
bugs that they hide, and EFIVA’s attempts at finding them based on environmental 
interactions. 
All programs and EFIVA were run on Linux. EFIVA itself is written in Java, 
and calls into our modified version of Strace, which was downloaded off 
SourceForge.net. 
3.4.1 Application crash due to null pointer reference 
A DoS (Denial of Service) attack is one of the most common methods of 
exploiting vulnerabilities. In the case of a console application, this attack is akin to 
crashing the program repeatedly, thus making it impossible to use. Consider the 
following code snippet: 
 
Figure 4 Null pointer de-reference crashes the application 
 
1 void ReadFromFile () 
2 { 
3  FILE * f = fopen ("foo.txt", "r"); 
4  char buf[100]; 
5  fgets (buf, 10, f); 






This example is simple, yet hides an extremely common source of 
vulnerabilities. The program does not process fopen’s return code making it 
susceptible to file open failures. If foo.txt does not exist, the code as written in 
Figure 4 will not create the file; the call to fgets on line 5 will cause a segmentation 
fault. Similarly, if the user running the above program does not have the permissions 
to read foo.txt, fopen will return null crashing the application at line 5. 
EFIVA detects this application’s susceptibility to DoS attacks by modifying 
foo.txt’s permissions (setting it to be readable only by root) and its existence 
(deleting it before the call to fopen) properties when the application is being 
executed. 
 
3.4.2 Race condition in file access 
Race conditions that originate from file accesses are probably the most 
significant among those that result in vulnerabilities [12]. The problem stems from 
the existence of a time delta between the two instances when a file’s property (e.g., 
access right) is checked, to when that property is actually used in the application. 
Such flaws are referred to as Time of Check to Time of Use (TOCTOU) flaws. 
The textbook example of a TOCTOU fault is a setuid
1
 program executing 
under root privileges [13].  
                                                 
1
 Unix has a setuid bit that allows for certain programs to grant users temporary privileges. When an 
executable file with its setuid bit turned on is executed, it assumes the privileges of its owner, as 





Figure 5 TOCTOU vulnerability in file accesses 
 
In this example, a race condition exists between the time when access() is 
called on file, and when file is actually opened. The programmer makes an 
implicit assumption that file remains unchanged between the two calls, which is 
incorrect! A clever attacker would have the file denote a symbolic link as opposed to 
a physical file name, and modify the target of the link between lines 1 and 3. 
EFIVA’s design and implementation makes it ideal to track such issues that 
arise from an application’s environmental interactions. When the tool detects a call to 
access(), it has immediately found a potential injection point. In the fault injection 
pass, the parameter to the access() is set to a symbolic link, and is modified as 
soon as the function returns. Any future use of the file thus points to the malicious 
location pointed to by EFIVA.  
Vulnerabilities that are born from race conditions in file accesses can be very 
difficult to detect without source code. At the core of the issue is the extremely small 
attack window (between lines 1 and 3) when file needs to be changed to 
successfully record an exploit. Our fault injection framework traces application 
execution making this process a lot more efficient, and easily reproducible.  
1 if (!access (file, W_OK)) 
2 { 
3  f = fopen (file, "w+"); 









3.4.3 Output comparisons for vulnerability detection 
 EFIVA provides users the ability to compare the expected output from an 
application to that actually produced when it is executed. The mechanism is 
inherently simple, and has the ability to produce false positives, especially if the 
expected output is not very well known. However, this is a better first step to finding 
vulnerabilities than using only a simple metric like checking for an application crash 
or a segmentation fault.  
 As an example, consider code snippet in Figure 6 below. The 
ListDirectoryContents() function does not allow a user to view the contents 
of the root directory. If the user provides a directory name that starts with ‘/’ as is the 
case for the root directory, the function exits. Assume that the program is being 
executed in the /home/foo directory, and the user’s input is ../../. This input 
combination corresponds to the root directory, but the code as written above will still 





Figure 6 Output comparisons for vulnerability detection 
 
The output should have been Cannot list contents of the root directory, which 
was provided in the input to EFIVA. However, the actual output obtained from the 
above code snippet was much different (the list of files and directories in the root 
directory).  A comparison between the two outputs failed, thus indicating the 
possibility of a security vulnerability. 
These three examples illustrate how EFIVA can be used in a real-world 
setting to discover potential security vulnerabilities in application. In the future, the 
tool can be expanded upon to track more system calls, and provide enhanced 
verifying capabilities. 
1 void ListDirectoryContents () 
2 { 
3  char dirname [100]; 
4  gets (dirname); 
5 
6  if (dirname [0] == '/') 
7  { 
8 printf ("Cannot list contents of the root 
directory"); 
9  } 
10  else 
11  { 
12   DIR * dir; 
13   struct dirent *entry; 
14 
15   if ((dir = opendir (dirname))!= NULL) 
16   { 
17    while (entry = readdir (dir)) 
18    { 
19     printf ("Entry : %s\n", entry=>d_name); 
20    } 
21   } 





Chapter 4: Expanding on the Environmental Approach 
  
Chapter 3 addressed the implementation of our EFIVA tool, and described 
some of the case studies that we used to validate that our approach is indeed workable 
and has potential to discover security vulnerabilities. With the confidence that 
dynamic, black box environmental perturbation and fault injection is an approach that 
can be used effectively to review the security characteristics of an application, we 
now address another important question. Is an Environmental Approach sufficient? Is 
there a mechanism to broaden this approach and discover new techniques, which 
when used independently or in conjunction with environmental perturbation have the 
potential to do an even better job of discovering vulnerabilities in applications? 
Through the rest of this chapter, we address these very questions, and propose a 
scheme that forms the basis for the rest of our work in this thesis. 
 
 
4.1 The pros of an environmental approach  
 One of the significant challenges of a black box approach is that a reviewer 
does not know exactly what resources or actions a program performs at each step. 
Every program under execution can be traced dynamically for the system calls that it 
executes. These system calls provide information about the resources that the 
program accesses, the actions performed on the resource and the parameters that 
further refine the specific action. For example, consider the open system call: 




This system call clearly indicates that the program is opening a file with name 
filename, and in the mode as specified by arguments, which could be “rw” 
which indicates that the file is opened for read and write, or “r” which means it is 
opened for read only, or any other valid combination. Gathering such information 
using a black box approach is impossible, or a very arduous process.  
 However, a smart fault injector can choose with ease, and automatically, the 
type and number of faults to inject when it encounters certain system calls and their 
corresponding parameters. Tracing the system calls executed by a process provides 
good insight into how an application has been programmed. Further, environmental 
fault injection is fully extensible; one can easily add new system calls and their 
corresponding candidate faults to the fault injector, thus broadening the scope of 
problems that can be discovered and exploited with this approach. 
 
 
4.2 The cons of an environmental approach 
 As discussed earlier, the most significant problem associated with a black box 
approach to finding vulnerabilities is detecting when a vulnerability has been exposed 
in the program. The challenge is determining the behavior and output of a program 
that has been compromised.  
 In the environmental approach, we used two criteria to detect a vulnerability, 
an application crash, and difference in the expected and actual program outputs. The 
application crash is easy to see; no program should crash because of faults injected 
either in it or in its environment. However, comparing expected and actual outputs is 




involves more than just the comparison between two character streams. Such a 
technique depends on a human security reviewer to provide the fault injector with 
expected output from the application for a certain set of injected faults, and is 
therefore dependent on the reviewer’s understanding of the program behavior. The 
reviewer provided output might be correct or incorrect. If correct, then a mismatch 
between expected and actual output indicates a vulnerability. On the other hand, if the 
reviewer is wrong, then a mismatch in the two outputs could mean either the program 
does not have a vulnerability (program output was correct, reviewer’s was wrong), or 
it indeed has one (both program and reviewer outputs were wrong).  
 Therefore, output comparisons could show both false positives and false 
negatives, making the role of the human verification all that more critical. In an 
environmental approach, until a better, automated solution is found, human 
verification will remain the primary mode of determining if a program has 
vulnerabilities. The fault injector can provide hints that at best could ease this 
process. 
 Another issue to consider, although obvious, is that environmental fault 
injection only traces those functions and resources that have system calls associated 
with them. There are numerous APIs, such as the string library in C, where the 
functions do not have corresponding system calls, yet are important sources of 
vulnerabilities. A most basic example would be the strcpy()function, which when 






4.3 Can we do better? 
 Environmental interactions are a large source of program vulnerabilities, and 
we can address them with our fault injection scheme as discussed above. Yet, there 
are other sources of vulnerabilities as well that need to be addressed if one desires a 
complete and thorough analysis of a program’s security characteristics. Over the past 
several years, numerous techniques, both static and dynamic have been proposed to 
find general program bugs, and those that are exploitable, i.e. vulnerabilities. If we 
look at the security review process through the eyes of a reviewer, the kind of 
approach that he/she can choose depends entirely on how much the reviewer knows 
about the program, and how detailed of an analysis is desired.   
To aid in this effort, we define a hierarchy of five approaches that extends 
from all black box where a compiled executable is analyzed, to all white box where 
the complete source code listing for the application is available. We use a set of four 
criteria to evaluate their relative effectiveness and usefulness. The next few sections 




4.4 Why do we need a hierarchy of approaches? 
Static techniques, software testing and fault injection can each form a 
significant component of the software vulnerability finding process. The kind of 
approach used in this process depends on the available program abstractions and their 




may range all the way from being just a compiled program (EXE), to having some 
amount of programmer-supplied metadata, to the program’s full source code listing.  
Our research focuses on constructing a hierarchy of approaches that can be 
used for finding vulnerabilities in applications given different amounts of program 
information. In particular, we start by assuming that the only data available about a 
program is the fully compiled executable, and relax our constraints to create a new 
level in the hierarchy, enabling better vulnerability analysis. Said differently, we start 
with a complete black-box approach, enter the grey-box mode, and ultimately end in 
a full white-box approach, each time reviewing the usefulness and effectiveness of 
the technique used in that particular level in finding vulnerabilities. At each level, we 
use fault injection as the tool to perform a security review, and use a set of four 
defined criteria to compare and contrast each level with its predecessors in the 
hierarchy. Having separate levels provides a platform for security reviewers to build 
upon depending on their requirements. These requirements may include, but are not 
restricted to the amount of time they are willing to spend on the process, the level of 
confidence that they desire in the software and the amount of information that they 
have available to perform a review. Even in the presence of an application’s full 
source listing, one may not desire a full static analysis of code, and may be quite 
happy with just running the program on certain select input combinations. On the 
other hand, one may want to perform extensive security analysis because of the 
critical nature of the application under review. Having a multi-tiered approach to 
finding vulnerabilities in programs allows for different degrees of review based on 







4.5 Why do security vulnerabilities happen? 
A bird’s eye view of software development reveals three primary sources of 
security vulnerabilities in software. First is incorrect program specification and 
architectural design, the second is poor implementation by the programmer, and the 
third is environmental interactions. A common example of poor architectural design 
is parameter tampering in web URLs. An attacker may be able to modify the 
parameters that are sent to the web server from the client, and view information that 
he/she is not authorized to access.  
The second source of vulnerabilities are programming bugs, and are caused by 
programmer oversight, carelessness, or sometimes an incomplete understanding of 
the nuances of programming language features. In the C world, an example of the 
latter would be the assumption that strcpy (src, dest) only copies the 
portion of src that fits in dest, when in fact the function performs a blind copy, 
potentially leading to a buffer overflow. While static analysis tools would easily catch 
this buffer overflow if provided with source code, finding this vulnerability in a 
compiled executable may not be as trivial. An example of programmer carelessness 
would be, not freeing all the memory that a program allocates dynamically, or trying 
to free a pointer twice. Finally, an example of programmer oversight would be not 




The third source of vulnerabilities, Environmental interactions refers to 
vulnerabilities introduced in an application by the use of resources or information 
from the environment where it is executed [14]. 
When a programmer writes code, he/she has a view of the program and an 
understanding of how control and data flows through it. Quite often, the 
programmer’s view is very different from how the written code actually behaves. It is 
in this gap between expected and actual application behavior that a program is most 
susceptible to functional bugs and vulnerabilities [15]. A smart hacker will either 
modify a program’s input, or change its execution environment or apply some other 
mutation to have the application move in a direction that is different from what the 
programmer ever expected it to take. This may involve exploring various execution 
paths, corrupting program data or even modifying sensitive information that an 
application depends on for its proper functioning. 
A security professional can use the very same techniques to identify and fix 
security vulnerabilities in a program before a hacker compromises it. He/she can use 
various techniques, such as static analysis, testing and fault injection. We use fault 




4.6 Fault Injection and a Hierarchy of Approaches 
Fault injection provides a framework that allows an external tool or person to 
inject faults in information that is important to the application, such as in its inputs, or 




approach, and is extremely flexible, making it an ideal foundation on which to build 
the techniques that are discussed in this thesis. Faults can be injected anywhere inside 
an application, i.e. program variables or in external information sources such as 
program input, or even in the environment where the program is executed. This 
versatility of fault injection techniques allows us to use it effectively in the whole 
spectrum of vulnerability finding approaches. 
Every application or program can be thought of as a graph, where each node is 
a state and the edges are transitions between the states. For every state that a program 
is in, a fault injector can modify parameters and force the application into new states; 
states that potentially expose exploitable security holes, i.e. security vulnerabilities. 
While the ability to modify internal program execution paths sounds very 
encouraging, it makes a very fundamental assumption; information such as the 
internal state of an application, its parameters and control flow are available for use 
by the fault injector. The basic premise of our approach is that we start with an 
executable, i.e. compiled binary code, making deciphering such information 
extremely challenging, or in some cases impossible. We thus define levels of 
abstraction to perform a program’s security analysis, with each level using different 
amounts of information. This information includes the view of the program (full 
source code, partial source code, etc), and extent of documentation available to the 
security reviewer. The fault injector may infer some of this information 
automatically, and will depend on the user to provide the rest. Notably, we define five 
different abstraction levels, Black Box Approach with an Executable, Black Box 




parameter metadata and finally White box approach with Full Application Source 
Code.  
White Box Approach with Full 
Application Source 
Flow Graph Approach with Parameter 
Metadata







































Figure 7  Black Box to White box - A hierarchy of fault injection based approaches for finding 
vulnerabilities 
 
In each of the levels as mentioned in Figure 7, fault injection can be used with 
varying levels of usefulness and effectiveness. We evaluate each level based on four 
fault injection criteria, as follows: 
i. The ability to choose a fault injection point 
Given an application, how does one know where a fault should be injected 
so that it affects the execution of the program in a meaningful way? 




This is the technique that is used to have the fault injected either in the 
application or its environment or its input or any other location. 
iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
A fault injector can inject faults in arbitrary locations, but analyzing the 
application’s behavior with the fault injected would not be very useful if 
the fault can never happen under normal usage of the application. 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered. 
How does one determine with a high level of confidence that a 
vulnerability has been discovered in the application by analyzing its 
behavior under fault injection? 
 
Our set of four criteria was constructed by taking two different views of fault 
injection; the first being the fault injector’s perspective, and the second being that of a 
security reviewer. The first three criteria are critical for any fault injector; it needs to 
know where, when and what faults need to be injected, and has to have a means to 
make the fault appear in the application or its surroundings. The fourth criterion is 
constructed from the most basic requirement for all vulnerability finding approaches: 





In the next chapter, we describe each of the levels in Figure 7 in detail, 
explore their use of fault injection, and characterize their usefulness in the 







Chapter 5: The Hierarchy of Approaches in Detail 
  
Chapter 4 explored the relative effectiveness of an environmental fault 
injection approach, motivated some of the reasons why applications have security 
vulnerabilities, and came to the conclusion that we could expand upon the 
environmental approach to develop new fault injection based techniques that can also 
be used to find security vulnerabilities. It also contained a discussion on the hierarchy 
of approaches, starting from the complete black box executable view of the program, 
to the full white box approach where the application source code is available for the 
reviewer to analyze. Interspersed between these two extremes were environmental 
fault injection and two techniques that used an internal program representation with 
some metadata as provided by the application’s programmer. 
 In this chapter, we discuss each of these techniques in detail and evaluate 
them using the set of four criteria that was also laid out in Chapter 4. 
 
 
5.1 Black Box Approach with an Executable 
At the most basic level, we assume that the only information available to a 
security evaluator is the compiled EXE. The executable does not have to be on the 
same machine as the security evaluator; it may be elsewhere on a network, or could 
even just be a website. The most obvious choice of techniques in the absence of any 
other useful guidelines is a black box approach where the security evaluator presents 




inputs, and those with malicious intent. With each injected fault, the program’s 
execution is traced and output is analyzed to determine if a vulnerability was found. 
As is quite obvious from a cursory examination of this approach, the state 
space to be explored is enormous. Using a fault injection approach, the large number 
of unique faults that can be injected, when coupled with the multiple inputs that 
programs typically take from the user, leads to a combinatorial explosion and makes 
for an extremely time consuming and exhausting evaluation process. Automation 
clearly has the ability to speed up such an approach, and it can be used effectively to 
ensure some basic security properties. For example, one can easily verify that an 
application does not crash when subjected to fault injected input. Similarly, if the 
application prints password information to the console in plain text, then there is a 
security vulnerability.  
This black box approach can be evaluated based on the four criteria stated 
earlier in Chapter 4. 
i. The ability to choose a fault injection point 
In a black box approach, there is a single fault injection point, the input to 
the application. However, the number of input permutations to be 
considered is enormous, and working with each one of them could be a 
very laborious process.  
ii. Ease of injecting a fault, i.e. the fault injection mechanism 
Faults are injected in the application input, which is done rather easily. 
The fault injector can generate any number of permutations based on 




iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
Every fault injected in this scheme is totally acceptable because an 
application should be willing to accept any and all input. A well-written 
program should not crash because of invalid input, but rather print an error 
message or exit gracefully. However, given a fault, determining its 
viability is extremely difficult because of the lack of program knowledge. 
Most of the faults are educated guesses, but ultimately, in a brute-force 
approach, they are just guesses. Most of the faults may not turn up any 
vulnerability in the program. 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered. 
This is the most complicated step in an all black-box approach. Without 
any additional knowledge about a program’s features, classifying its 
behavior as one that indicates the existence or absence of a security 
vulnerability, is extremely difficult. For example, consider all the metadata 
that a program writes to a file for its future use. Such metadata may 
include user preferences, passwords and other important information. If 
the security reviewer is not aware of the significance of each piece of file 
content, he/she may miss what is security critical. This may however be 




The vulnerability verification step can be significantly improved if the 
security reviewer is provided with a detailed specification of the program, 
such as, the implementation spec created by the application developers. 
Such a document would provide a lot more insight into the design of each 
program component, and the interactions between them. Such program 
details would allow for a more intelligent choice of faults, and potentially 
reduce the number of faults that need to be injected in the system. 
 
 In summary, while a complete black box approach may not prove to be very 
reliable in finding a vast majority of application vulnerabilities, the level of 




5.2 Black Box Environmental Approach 
 Chapters 2 and 3 described the environmental perturbation approach 
extensively. Therefore, we only summarize the evaluation of this technique using the 
four criteria laid out in Chapter 4. 
i. The ability to choose a fault injection point 
In this approach, the fault injector injects a fault when it encounters a 
system call that it recognizes, making the process of choosing the injection 
point easy. 




Environmental perturbation involves changing the external factors that 
impact an application, such as modifying file ownership, their contents or 
their existence properties (delete a file, create one when the application 
does not expect it). These changes are applied to the execution 
environment, and are thus easily implemented.  
iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
The viability of an injected fault is also trivial because changes to the 
environment are independent of the execution of a program. This is the 
primary reason why this technique is so useful; changes can happen when 
an application least expects it. 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered. 
This is the most challenging component of a truly dynamic, automated 
fault discovery mechanism. There is no easy way to determine if a 
vulnerability has been discovered without a detailed knowledge of the 
workings of the application, and its error states. However, two useful 
checks that can be used are, checking for application crashes, and output 
comparison. If for a given action, the output as expected from an 
application does not match the actual output observed, then there is the 
potential for a vulnerability. The ultimate check is still one that is 




this black-box approach leads us to assume that the security reviewer is 
very familiar with the application through its constant use, or is provided 
with a specification document from the application developers to better 
understand the program’s assumptions and workings. 
  
5.3 Using Program Representations to find vulnerabilities 
The previous two techniques, complete black box approach, and the 
environmental approach, try to find vulnerabilities in applications by looking at their 
external characteristics and behavior, i.e. from the perspective of an application user. 
However, a lot of useful information can also be gathered by looking at a program’s 
internal representation, its states and control flow. These internal structures provide a 
great opportunity for a tool such as a fault injector to modify, with relative ease, the 
flow of data and control in a program. These changes can be made dynamically at 
runtime, allowing the fault injector to discover new paths and conditions as variables 
assume different values inside a program. A program exposes a deviation from its 
correct behavior by taking different control flow paths than what is expected for 
certain input. We view such deviations as a manifestation of an exploited 
vulnerability. 
5.3.1 Choosing an internal program state representation 
 
A program’s internal representation can be described using various concepts, 
such as a Control Flow Graph, Data Flow Graph or a Program Dependence Graph. 




flow and structure [15, 16]. The CFG is a directed graph where each node is a basic 
block and the edges represent control flow. A basic block in turn is a linear sequence 
of instructions with exactly one exit. When the processor starts executing a basic 
block, it continues execution in a single sequence until the end of the basic block; 
there are no branches or halts. A CFG therefore presents two distinct possibilities to 
affect change through fault injection. Not only can faults be injected to change the 
direction of execution that a program chooses, but also to modify program data.  
A Data Flow Graph (DFG) is a graphical representation of a program’s data 
flow and structure. It represents the possible changes in the state of data objects, i.e. 
their creation, use and destruction [15]. This graph does not have any control flow 
information associated with it, making its applicability in finding vulnerabilities 
rather limited. In tracking security vulnerabilities, we desire an understanding of a 
program’s actions, for it is usually here that a program is susceptible to attack. The 
third representation, Program Dependence Graph (PDG) is a hybrid of dataflow and 
control flow graphs [17]. It is a directed graph where vertices are program statements 
and control predicates, while the edges correspond to data and control dependencies 
[18]. A fault injector can determine fault values using the combined data and control 
flow information so that it not only affects the direction that a program takes, but also 
the value of its variables, thus potentially creating states that were not previously 
considered by the programmer. 
All three program representations have the potential to be used for finding 
vulnerabilities, but one may be more effective than the other in helping us achieve our 




a compiled executable, when trying to analyze its security characteristics. Typically, 
structures such as the CFG, DFG and PDG are constructed from full program source 
code, forcing us to find a workaround when working with compiled binary code. 
Tools such as EEL [19] construct a CFG from an executable, but in the absence of 
source code, the graph is represented using the most basic assembly language 
instructions. A graph with only assembly instructions makes it very difficult to 
decipher deep program characteristics, such as data types of variables used in the 
program, the use of pointers, arrays, etc. Such information can be used effectively in 
fault injection; for example, integers can be tested for overflow problems, buffers can 
be tested for buffer overflows and characters can be tested for non-ASCII input. 
Further, while registers and variables can be modified at the assembly level to 
discover bugs, proving that such bugs are exploitable vulnerabilities can be quite 
challenging. Along the same difficulty level is the task of confirming that a suspected 
vulnerability is indeed a vulnerability. This confirmation step, except for the most 
basic cases such as an application crash or hang depends on user provided 
information. It may be less than reasonable to expect a security evaluator to provide 
any program hints at the assembly level, especially if the data returned from a 
function is not a simple character or integer, but a more complicated data type such as 
a class object.  
 This inability to make a connection between program structures and assembly 
code in the absence of full source code listing makes using CFGs, DFGs and PDGs as 
representations of binary/machine code for internal fault injection rather difficult and 




to get more information about the behavior and characteristics of compiled code. 
PDGs that are constructed using this intermediate representation or metadata will be 
an extremely useful tool in security analysis.  
This kind of intermediate representation is provided today by Java (in 
bytecode), and C# (in Microsoft Intermediate Language, MSIL). The ease of 
programming offered by these languages and their corresponding managed execution 
frameworks (Java Virtual Machine, Common Language Runtime), and the increased 
tendency of software developers to use componentized code means that more and 
more applications in the future will be written using these new technologies. The 
intermediate formats contain information about the data types of variables, the names 
of API functions being invoked and their parameters, string values, and an excellent 
metadata store from which control and data flow information can be extracted with 
relative ease. These are exactly the tenets that we desire in a program representation 
to effectively choose the faults that are injected to find vulnerabilities. Through the 
rest of this thesis, we use Java bytecode as the foundation on which our techniques 
are built and analyzed. It is important to note here that our approach is in no way 
restricted to bytecode. Intermediate information and metadata provided by compilers 
or even externally by the application programmer could be used effectively in our 
fault injection scheme. The ideas presented henceforth are general in nature and fully 
extensible.  
The increased availability of metadata and knowledge about program internals 
though the use of bytecode now allows us to choose between the various 




5.3.2 Program Dependence Graph as Internal Representation 
 
 The Program Dependence Graph is a hybrid of a data flow and control flow, 
making this most suitable for fault injection, when compared to the other two 
representations, i.e. the CFG and DFG. The data flow component of the graph will 
enable the fault injector to track the use of variables in a program, and thus values, 
thus allowing for better, more intelligent choices when injecting faults. Similarly, the 
control flow component allows the injector to force different execution paths on the 
program by modifying internal variables. The interdependence of control and data 
flow can be very helpful in finding security vulnerabilities, as we shall discuss in later 
sections. A PDG can be constructed automatically using one of the several algorithms 




5.4 Basic Flow Graph Approach 
 Having chosen the PDG as the representation of program structure, we now 
describe our first approach that uses this graph to find security vulnerabilities.  
The figure below shows the PDG for one of the possible implementations of a 





Figure 8 Possible implementation of debit () function in financial applications 
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Figure 9 PDG representation for debit () function 
 
 As shown in the graph above, the function branches into two different 
directions based on the value of the variable tempBal. The fault injector could thus 
1 int debit (int balance, int debitAmount) 
2 { 
3  int tempBal = balance - debitAmount; 
4 
5  if (tempBal > 0) 
6  { 
7   balance -= debitAmount; 
8  } 
9 





modify the values of balance and debitAmount to have the branch take two 
different directions in different executions. If the function were to have further 
conditional statements, then several more paths could be constructed. The return 
value from this function will be used in other functions, and thus inserting a fault in 
the return code will automatically propagate itself through the rest of the program. 
From the source listing (Figure 8) and PDG (Figure 9) above, it is clear that the return 
value from the function could be any integer value. How does one determine whether 
a given return value constitutes a vulnerability in the application? In the absence of 
any other information, the most obvious approach is to let execution continue and 
wait for a violating condition, such as an application crash, or an error message 
printed by the program, and then flag the fault(s) injected during that execution run as 
ones that led to the discovery of an application vulnerability.  
 However, this approach could lead to a state explosion. It would be impossible 
for the fault injector to choose a correct subset of faults to be injected that could 
violate the assumptions of the programmer. What this approach does provide is the 
ability to change a program’s execution profile, and modify its variables and 
parameters dynamically, and adapt any changes to the path followed by the program 
until that point in the execution. It also allows for a very modular approach to 
vulnerability discovery. Each function can be considered individually, and by 
modifying the parameters passed to it, a subroutine can be isolated as an execution 
unit. This allows for fault injection on both the local level (a function), and a global 




This technique, i.e. using a flow graph to find vulnerabilities in an application 
when measured against the four criteria we defined earlier provides the following 
results: 
i. Ability to choose a fault injection point 
Under this approach, every variable is a potential fault injection point; in 
particular those that can affect the outcome of conditional branches. That 
is certainly a lot of choices, and could lead to state explosion. 
ii. Ease of injecting a fault, i.e. fault injection mechanism 
The program would be executed using a debugger service, making the 
modification of variable values extremely simple. 
iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
The modified variable values can be traced back in the PDG to discover 
their dependence on external input. While it may be time consuming to 
compute this for every variable, a potential fault injected can be verified as 
one that can indeed happen in a program during its course of execution. 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered. 
As discussed earlier, this is the most complicated step of an automated 
fault injection process. In the absence of any information about the state of 
variables inside the program that indicate its normal functioning, one 




output to verify that a vulnerability has been exposed. This step therefore 
requires human help and intelligence. 
 The two most significant issues associated with this approach are the inability 
to be very intelligent about the faults that are injected into the program, and the 
relative difficulty in verifying that an application’s behavior indicates that it has a 
vulnerability. Both of these deficiencies can be overcome if the user provides more 
information about the program’s behavior. 
 
 
5.5 Flow Graph Approach with Parameter Metadata 
 As mentioned above, the two main deficiencies of using a basic flow graph 
approach exclusively with no additional data can be abated by having the user 
provide a little more information about the program. A program is a collection of 
functions that are executed in some sequence. When a programmer uses an API or 
components written by someone else, he/she does so by invoking functions that are 
part of the API. We thus consider a function to be a useful abstraction, around which 
we can build metadata and criteria to help the fault injection process. 
5.5.1 Functions and their abstraction 
 A function can be thought of as a unit comprising three primary components, 
the input parameters, body of the function, and its return value. In an API, the code 
comments for each function as provided by the author describes the input parameters, 
return value, and provides a brief, high-level description of the purpose of the 




about program input, and constraints that describe possible return values from the 
subroutine. 
 We see program comments as a source of very useful information that can be 
used to improve fault injection process. If for legal inputs to a function, an injected 
fault causes the return value to be something other than that specified by the author of 
the function, we have discovered a vulnerability. Similarly, a programmer’s 
assumptions about inputs to a function may be invalid, or unexpected input not 
handled correctly, giving another source of program vulnerabilities. The goal of fault 
injection is to produce output that does not match the constraints as laid out by the 
programmer. The metadata that is available in a function’s comments provides the 
fault injector hints about faults to inject so that the function produces certain (wrong!) 
output, while the subroutine’s PDG representation provides the fault injector hints on 
how to go about achieving the same. 
5.5.2 Using parameter information in fault injection 
 Consider the debit() function example from Figure 8 and the following 
constraints provided by the programmer: 
a. Return value >= 0 
Suppose balance < 0 and debitAmount is greater than 
balance, then tempBal is always < 0 and the function returns the original 
negative valued balance variable. This is not in agreement with the 
constraint provided by the programmer, and will therefore be flagged under 




propagate elsewhere in the code under the programmer’s assumption that the 
balance value as returned by the debit() function is always correct.  
Consider a slightly different set of function inputs. When 
debitAmount < 0, and balance > 0. Then, tempBal would be > 0, 
and the function would return a value that is larger than the original balance in 
the account. This is a problem!  
  Similarly, assume that the balance variable is negative. If 
debitAmount were a negative quantity less than balance, then the 
variable tempBal would become greater than zero, and this would be 
returned as the new balance.  
  In the last two examples, the function returns positive (although 
incorrect!) quantities for the balance, and therefore satisfies the programmer 
provided constraint, which only requires the return value to be greater than or 
equal to zero. Our approach would not detect the input combinations as that 
potentially exploit vulnerabilities! Therefore, the success of using a metadata-
based approach for finding vulnerabilities is dependent in no small part on the 
hints provided to the fault injector by the programmer. 
One could claim that a programmer knows his code best and only 
makes calls to the function debit()with correct input, i.e. by validating 
parameters before it is sent to the function, and by validating output after it is 
returned from it. No matter what these assumptions are, based on the criteria 
provided for the input and output, this function when considered as a separate 




code’s ownership changes in the future, or it is opened up as an API or web 
service, at which point the damage that could be done by malicious code as 
listed above is enormous. The fault injector would be better off flagging such 
cases as potential vulnerabilities, and the effect of the incorrect return values 
from the function can be studied in the program’s flow graph at points were 
debit() is called. 
 
b. Input balance > return value 
This is another possible user specified constraint, and it shows similar 
vulnerabilities to the ones discussed in part a. For example, consider that 
balance were negative, and debitAmount is a negative value less than 
balance. The difference, tempBal would become positive, and the 
function would thus return a positive value. However, this is clearly in 
violation of the user provided criterion, which specifies that the input balance 
(which is negative) should be greater than the balance value returned by the 
value (which in fact postitive). By our formulation, such behavior corresponds 
to the program having a security vulnerability. The same input combinations 
was used in a. and it was unsuccessful in finding the vulnerability, yet, under 
the constraints laid out here would the set of function inputs would help 
discover the vulnerability. The only difference between a. and b. is the 





 As can be seen from the examples above, the kind of faults to be injected 
depends on the output that needs to be generated to show that the function’s execution 
is in violation of the assumptions made by the programmer. This makes user provided 
criteria about return values from functions an absolute requirement. Input criteria, i.e. 
information on parameters on the other hand are not required, but their use would 
make finding vulnerabilities a lot easier. Consider the following code execution 
sequence: 
 
Figure 10 Usefulness of metadata provided by programmers 
 
 If the user provides input criteria for FooFunc, i.e. defines some constraints 
on A, and B, the logic until line 2 could have faults injected in it, so that these 
constraints would be violated. If such a code execution path is found, then the 
programmer’s assumptions are invalid, and thus there is a potential vulnerability in 
the program. 
 Therefore, constraints defined on the input parameters and return values of a 
function are not only useful when that function is checked independently for security 
vulnerabilities, but also when calls are made to this function elsewhere in the code.  
5.5.3 How are fault values chosen? 
 The discussion around the debit()function above considered possible input 
combinations for variables balance and debitAmount that violate some of the 
programmer provided criteria and assumptions. However, if this process is to be 
1 // Application code 
2 // A and B are variables computed 
//before this line 




automated, the fault injector needs to determine what fault values can be legitimately 
inserted at each step when the application is executed. We use a range-based 
approach, where at each step, the range of values that a variable may take is tracked. 
Each time an instruction is executed, the possible values for a variable are updated. 
Consider the following example: 
 
Figure 11 Example to illustrate the use of variable ranges 
 
In this example, variable x can assume any legal integer value at line 2. This 
stays the same in lines 3 and 4. However, after line 5 executes, x is restricted to the 
set of even integers. Tracking these range of values for integer variables allows for a 
final comparison of the constraints as provided by the user to the range of values as 
deciphered by the fault injector by looking at the program’s dependence graph. Any 
mismatch between the two signals a potential vulnerability. A fault can then be 
injected anywhere in the execution sequence to trigger an exploit. 
5.5.4 Usefulness of bytecode  
 Consider the code snippet below, which is a simple function that accesses a 
database, and retrieves results by executing a query. 
When the fault injector locates the executeQuery() method, it can 
automatically modify the connection string to include a SQL injection attack. 
Similarly, since the value returned from the function is a ResultSet object, the 
1 int function (int x) 
2 {  
3   x = x + 2; 
4   x = x * 2; 





programmer could define some rules and constraints about the expected output from 
any queries that the function executes. For example, the programmer could list the 
relationship between certain columns in the output with the inputs to the function 
(and thus the SQL query). Alternatively, one could define a constraint on the number 
of results returned by the query. Specifying and using criteria as exhaustive and 
informative as those listed above would be impossible, or extremely hard using just 







Figure 12 Java code that uses a very simple SQL query 
 
The above methodology could in general be extended to any function, be it an 
API function in the Java class libraries, or one written by the application programmer 
himself. The abstraction of a program at a higher level, with more information about 
the functions invoked, and the input parameters allows for the fault injection scheme 
to be more advanced, and also allow for a better vulnerability verification process.  
 This overall technique, which utilizes a PDG along with programmer provided 
metadata and constraints on function input and return values, can be summarized by 
looking at our four evaluation criteria. 
i. The ability to choose a fault injection point 
1 public ResultSet accessData (String name, String username, 
String password) throws SQLException 
2 { 
3 String query = "Select * from FooTable where name="+name; 
4 Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(query, 
username, password); 
5   
6  ResultSet r = conn.createStatement().executeQuery(query); 
7   





Faults can be injected arbitrarily at any point in the source code because it 
is done though a debugger. Injecting a fault is the same as modifying a 
variable’s value. 
ii. Ease of injecting a fault, i.e. the fault injection mechanism 
As mentioned in i., it is just a simple use of the debugger to modify 
variable values. 
iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
The PDG allows each variable to be traced back to the sources on which it 
is dependent, such as external input, or their un-initialized use in a 
function. Once such a source has been found, the injected fault becomes 
entirely viable. 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered. 
This ability is one of the biggest gains of this method. The moment the 
fault injector discovers that one of the criteria provided by the user about 
input parameters to a function, or a function’s return value do not match 
up with the information inferred through analysis of the PDG, the program 
suffers from a potential vulnerability. This is because a programmer’s 
assumptions and understanding of the behavior of a program manifest 
themselves on the constraints that he/she defines, and when these are 








5.6 White Box Approach with Full Application Source Code  
 The final level in our hierarchy is when an application’s entire source code 
listing is available for the consuming application. In this case, one could use both 
static and dynamic techniques to discover program vulnerabilities. Having metadata 
as described in the previous section could still be useful because it would enable a 
tool to find the differences between the programmer’s assumed and actual 
implementations. Dynamic techniques such as environmental perturbation would be a 
good complement to static verification methods, as they deal with the effect of 
changing external factors on an application. Such conditions may be difficult to infer 
by just looking at the source code.  
The availability of source code also allows for a unique form of fault 
injection. Application code can be modified so that when the program starts 
execution, control is short-circuited to a part of the program where a preliminary 
analysis by the user identified a potential vulnerability. This portion of code could 
then be subject to faults injected through the program input. Modifying source code to 
implement such short cuts has the potential to reduce the amount of time spent 
evaluating the application because unnecessary code is ignored; such an optimization 
would be impossible if the application were only available as a compiled executable. 





i. The ability to choose a fault injection point 
With the full source code available, a reviewer will be able to analyze the 
program in detail and determine exactly the fault injection point desired. 
Source code can then be modified to have control jump directly to location 
with suspected vulnerabilities and this can be tested using faults injected 
either in one of the program variables or external input. 
ii. Ease of injecting a fault, i.e. the fault injection mechanism 
A fault can be injected anywhere inside the program by modifying source 
code or outside it by changing inputs or environmental resources.  
iii. The ability to determine if an injected fault is actually viable, i.e. is a bug 
exploitable thus making it a vulnerability 
An analysis of the source code would reveal if there is a control flow path 
to the vulnerable segments, and an input combination that forces the 
program down this path. Once such a path is discovered, it can be verified 
by injecting a fault and tracing program execution. 
iv. The ability to verify that the application’s behavior with the fault injected 
indicates that it has been compromised and a vulnerability has been 
discovered. 
With access to the full source code, one should be able to determine the 
security policy assumptions of the application. When the program behaves 





In summary, when full source code is available, any number of static 
techniques and tools [4, 5, 6] can be used, and dynamic approaches are a worthy 
complement to static approaches. They can expose certain sources of vulnerabilities 
(for example race conditions) that could be missed by a purely static analysis of the 
source code. It is up to the security reviewer to choose the balance between the 
dynamic and static approaches that can be used when one has full access to the 
program’s source listing. 
 
 
5.7 Comparative Summary of the five different approaches 
 The table below summarizes the advantages and shortcomings of each of the 
five approaches that were described above. The columns represent the approaches, 
while the rows represent the four criteria that we defined earlier to aid us in 
evaluating each technique. 
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 With the ever increasing complexity of software, and developers’ reliance on 
code not written by them (but which is not always well tested and security analyzed 
either), the need for a security analysis framework that can be used to analyze and 
evaluate the security characteristics of an application or library is urgent. This 
problem can be approached from any number of different directions, either static 
analysis or dynamic schemes such as software testing and fault injection. The use of 
fault injection in finding security vulnerabilities is a nascent field and provides a lot 
of opportunity for innovation and improvisation of existing approaches. 
  Every program executes in an environment, and uses information and data 
that it collects by interacting with its surroundings. This presents a significant 
opportunity to find program vulnerabilities by injecting faults in resources as they are 
used by programs during runtime. Towards achieving this goal and testing our 
hypotheses, we developed EFIVA, Environmental Fault Injector and Vulnerability 
Analyzer, which perturbs the environment and uses all three steps of a fault injection 
process: identifying a fault injection point, injecting the fault, and ultimately verifying 
that a vulnerability has been exposed in the program. 
 While environmental perturbations are certainly a significant source of 
vulnerabilities, other factors, such as an application’s use of API functions that do not 




application’s resilience to attack. We therefore propose a more extended hierarchy of 
approaches that a security reviewer can choose from depending on the application’s 
available abstractions. Clearly, the more a person knows about a program and its 
behavior, the better ability he has to analyze the program’s security policies to find 
potential vulnerabilities and attack points. In realization of this fact, the different 
levels of our hierarchy each assume different program abstractions and amount of 
information available about the application. 
 Such a hierarchy would not be useful unless one is able to compare and 
contrast each approach. We therefore use a set of four criteria to analyze each 
technique’s strengths and weaknesses. Such a comparison will allow any person to 
choose a technique that is right for their situation depending on how much is known 
about the application, the time available to perform the security review, and 
ultimately the level of confidence that is desired in the robustness and security 
properties of the application. 
 
 
6.2 Future Work  
 The work presented in this thesis can be expanded in the future, and we 
describe some of the possibilities below. 
i. Expanded environmental interactions 
Du and Mathur’s results in [10] suggested that the number of security 
vulnerabilities associated with network and inter-process communication 
were significantly lesser than those that were attributed to file system 




interactions in our fault injector. With attackers inflicting damage of 
increasing magnitude and applications become increasingly connected 
over the network, network communication will be a critical source of 
vulnerabilities in the future, and should be modeled in our fault injector. 
  Similarly, there are other sources of vulnerabilities in programs such 
as multiple threads of execution and resources such as the system clock 
that can be modeled as well. 
ii. An improved vulnerability verification scheme 
A critical limitation of the black box environmental scheme, and the black 
box approach with an executable is the inability to claim with a high level 
of confidence that a program’s behavior with a fault injected does indicate 
the presence of a security vulnerability. 
While output matching is a start, tests that are more conclusive need to 
be developed so that one can claim with confidence that an application has 
been compromised. A possible approach could be the use of application 
specifications to infer expected behavior, but a standard format needs to be 
constructed that all program specifications should adhere to. This enters 
the realm of formal verification methods, where a lot of work has already 
been done to address similar problems. 
iii. Objected Oriented concerns and a specification scheme for parameter 
metadata 
In our flow graph with metadata approach, we assumed that the 




parameters, and return values from a function. For return values and 
parameters that are objects, a programmer might be reluctant to expose 
hidden fields in the corresponding class. This is a valid concern, because 
providing information about private variables violates the encapsulation 
properties of Object Oriented Programming.  However, providing such a 
capability could improve the vulnerability finding process. 
 In addition, a scheme needs to be developed for representing all of this 
metadata information provided by the programmer. One possibility is the 
use of XML which has been gaining increased momentum and is now the 
standard format for several web technologies such as WSDL, XML-RPC 
and RSS. 
iv. More approaches in the hierarchy, and domain specific techniques 
We currently have five approaches in our hierarchy, but there is always 
room for more. With greater refinement of the constraints and abstractions 
of programs, one may be able to include more levels so that a reviewer has 
an increased set of options to make the right choice. 
 Further, our approaches are good for generic, executable applications, 
but with an explosion in the number of websites and online commerce, 
web applications are a significant class of programs that need analysis. 
The kind of security problems that they face may be very different from 
what console applications experience, especially with issues such as 




proposed here can grow to include more domain specific applications, and 
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